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Abstract 
In economic geography and cognate disciplines, a good deal of attention has been paid to the 
roles of investors, lenders, analysts, advisors, actuaries, and other skilled financial professionals 
in forming and reproducing financial and other markets. Relatively neglected, by contrast, is the 
work of lawyers, judges and other legal agents. This article redresses this imbalance by making 
two contributions. First, we highlight the role of legal labor in financial market formation in 
Malaysia, specifically the role of Shariah jurists and translators in institutionalizing the 
(re)production of Islamic values in market life. Second, drawing on cases of financial litigation 
and interviews with Shariah scholars, we argue that Malaysia’s strategy to develop its Islamic 
financial governance institutions, to bolster its international stature and extend the regional, 
national and international reach and mobility of its Islamic values, is intrinsically geographical in 
nature. The strategy involves a rescaling and consolidation of legal spaces and institutions -  
including the Central Bank, the juridical system, Islamic universities, research think-tanks, and 
their Shariah bureaucrats and professionals - to facilitate the geographical mobility of Malaysian 
sharia expertise to otherwise secular legal spaces. Yet, we argue that this strategy has not led to a 
retreat from neoliberal influence but rather a re-ordering of market values and norms that 
collateralizes moral risks in addition to market risks.  
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Introduction 
While it is generally recognized that neoliberal capitalism has rendered dissociated market 
relations the dominant form of social relations in many countries today, economic geographers 
and other scholars have insisted on the provincialization of such relations in two senses. One strand 
of provincialization has been to stress the unevenness of neoliberalizing projects and the 
unattainability of frictionless market rule (Brenner et al. 2010).  From Japan’s alliance capitalism 
(Gerlach 1992) and Asia’s developmental capitalism (Johnson 1982, Glassman and Choi 2014) to 
the varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001) and variegated capitalism (Peck and Theodore 
2007), significant conceptual effort has been devoted to delineating the imperfect spatial and 
institutional realization of neoliberal markets. It may be tempting to add Islamic capitalism to the 
hybrids. Islamic finance exemplifies a suite of economic practices that can arguably challenge 
neoliberal market relations. A second strand of provincialization has pushed economic 
geographical scholarship to internationalize its analytical and empirical foci (Pollard and Samers 
2007, Pollard et al. 2009, Vira and James, 2011). In devising knowledge and institutional assets 
that contradict, or are offered as an alternative to western norms and values, Islamic finance 
provides one avenue for unsettling neoliberal distinctions between persons and things, self-interest 
and altruism, and freedom and obligation1.  For all the heterogeneity of Islamic finance, its core 
prohibitions of riba (interest) and gharar (excessive risk) mark it out as committed – at least in 
principle - to work against usury and unethical behavior.  
                                                 
1 Graeber’s (2001) distinction between persons and things locates human exchanges as the exchange of 
persons. In the context of this paper, personhood is relational: individual agency is immersed in moral 
communities, constituted inside rather than outside of religious relations, and bound by ethics of altruism 
and obligatory reciprocity (Piot, 1999). 
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This article interrogates such unsettling drawing on Malaysia’s attempts to collateralize 
Shariah values, in the sense of transforming the social and religious relations of individuals and 
their communities into accountable legal “things”.  We examine this proposition in the context of 
Malaysia which is emerging as a global leader in Islamic finance (Lai and Samers 2017; Bassens 
et al.2012). In so doing, the article makes two contributions to economic geographical literatures. 
First, it  highlights the role of Shariah jurists and translators in financial market formation. 
Historically, markets, in liberal and neoliberal forms, have relied on legal and institutional 
practices to establish and maintain economic order. In economic geographical literatures, however, 
lawmaking and its agents are often relegated to a supporting role (see also Riles, 2016) and legal 
norms, and their material realization, remain something of a black box yet to be studied as the 
center of “claims-making” in economic geography (Martin et al. 2010). Second, drawing on 
Islamic financial litigation cases and interviews with Shariah scholars, we argue that strategies to 
thicken institutions of Islamic market governance are intrinsically geographical; they involve 
rescaling Shariah norms and opening up secular jurisdictional spaces to Shariah jurisprudence and 
its legal scripts. This rescaling, we argue, is strategic for Malaysia’s ambition to be an international 
Islamic financial center. Paradoxically, however, such a juridical project does not lead to a retreat 
from neoliberal influence but rather the re-ordering of market values and norms to collateralize 
moral as well as market risks.   
In the next section, we explore Malaysian Islamic finance and its position in literatures on 
comparative capitalisms. We then discuss neoliberal ideas about market values and an emerging 
heterodox body of work on values in market-formation.  Specifically, we point to the importance 
of understanding market value-making as a juridical project.  This is demonstrated through an 
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analysis of the geography of Shariah legalities in Malaysia before concluding with a discussion 
of our key findings. 
 
Capitalisms, value and law-making 
Varieties of Capitalism and Variegated Capitalism 
Comparative capitalism has gathered pace with valuable insights from the scholarship on 
varieties of capitalism (VoC) (Hall and Soskice 2001) and variegated capitalism (VC) (Peck and 
Theodore 2007).  This scholarship highlights institutional similarities as well as differences 
among developed countries. However, the VoC and VC literature is also foregrounded by 
writings in the 1980s and 1990s that identified East and Southeast Asian (ESEA) capitalism as 
distinct from the West in institutional and social organizational form. This body of work, 
originating from Johnson’s (1982) developmental state to its more Neo-Weberian variants 
(Glassman and Choi 2014), has challenged the World Bank’s (1993) neoliberal explanations of 
the region’s economic emergence.2   
 Whether or not ESEA capitalism may be functionally classified according to Hall and 
Soskice’s (2001) axes of liberal or coordinated market economies, neoliberalism’s influence on 
VoC and VC framing is apparent.  Witt (2010), for example, finds that Chinese capitalism is 
closer to the US-model. Meanwhile Peck and Zhang (2013: 367) raise the question if China may 
be described to be “tendentially neoliberal” while Crotty and Lee (2006) argue that the East 
Asian model captures “neoliberal mediocrity”. Economists too have joined the comparative 
                                                 
2 The well-narrated story of World Bank’s (1993) The East Asian Miracle associated East Asian 
countries’ economic development to entrepreneurial capacities, that is, export promotion, high levels of 
savings and investment as well as fiscal practices that moved their economies towards freer market 
relations and private property rights.  
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capitalism discourse. Sapir (2006) for instance has identified four models of European capitalism 
based on countries’ levels of social assistance and egalitarianism.  
 Yeung (2016) argues that the role of the state may be diminishing as lead East and 
Southeast Asian firms pursue local-transnational strategic coupling in global production 
networks (GPNs).  Others interpret state retreat as the recuperation of neoliberalism (Kim, 1999). 
It has been suggested that neoliberalism also constitutes a social doctrine that makes certain 
assumptions about the nature of social relations that are supported domestically by central banks 
and internationally by the World Bank (Harrison 2005). Institutional agencies’ purchase of the 
term is manifest in increasing professional management that helps change society relations into 
market-based distanciated social relations (see also Blomley 2005). Not surprisingly, Asian 
capitalism is bolstered by a cadre of technocrats and professionals who have played a significant 
role in their countries’ global integration to trade and investment.  In this sense, Asian capitalism 
may be better captured by Sheppard and Leitner’s (2010) “neoliberal supplement” which sees 
ESEA capitalism less as a neoliberal variety than the broadening of the restrictive definition of 
neoliberalism.  
While the discussions on VOC, VC, neoliberal varieties and supplements have shed much 
light on comparative capitalisms, they are less focused on the ethical assumptions of neoliberal 
morality:  neoliberalism’s foundation of ethics is driven by a Hayekian distaste for 
authoritarianism (Bloom, 2017). Market relations are said to be ethical because they create social 
relations that are free from political subjugation. Human values are defined in terms of personal 
(e.g. self-interest) rather than community wellness. Perhaps for this reason, O’Neill and Weller 
(2016), Harvey (2005) and Eagleton-Pierce (2016) have called for a better understanding of 
human well-being to explain motivations for securing resources. Attention to human well-being 
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is prized in Malaysia’s Islamic financial capitalism (IFC) which presents itself as an alternative 
model with a normative vision of human welfare. This model attempts to challenge neoliberal 
tendencies to reduce human value to self-interest with little regard for community. 
 
Neoliberalism and Values 
Perhaps the most fervent voice of neoliberal market morality has been Milton Friedman 
(1962/1982) who argued that markets foster morality in that they enable individuals and firms to 
freely and rationally dispose of their possessions as they see fit.3 Bhagwati (2011), a stalwart 
supporter of the neoliberal market, recognizes that self-interest represents an individual’s “basest 
motive” (p. 163), but contends that such motivation nonetheless produces efficient outcomes. 
Moreover, while conceding that Sapir’s (2006) account of communitarian values in more 
egalitarian European countries illustrates that religion and family may influence national political 
economic values, he nonetheless conceives such values as non-economic objectives of the utility 
function.  
 A utilitarian approach to community and religious value misses the point that the 
marketplace demands a distinction between persons and things, interest and altruism, and 
freedom and obligation (Graeber 2001). Social relations in neoliberal markets are de-
personalized as exemplified by the crafting of legal scripts and collaterals (e.g. contracts) so that 
human values (e.g. altruism, generosity) are replaced by market values (Sandel 2013). Such 
utilitarian values can produce harm by rewarding greed. As Malaysia’s Dr. Mahathir Mohamad 
observed in his criticism of the 2008 financial crisis: 
                                                 
3 See Birch (2016) on how neoclassical economics has influenced financial economics and business 
schools’ understandings of neoliberal markets. 
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“Capitalism has given many nations prosperity but when capitalism is combined 
with unbridled greed, the result is what we are seeing today… a market of greedy 
people cannot be expected to have ethics or even a sense of responsibility to 
themselves and even less to society.” (Mahathir 2011) 
 
The view that conventional finance draws from a narrow instrumental understanding of human 
values has influenced Malaysia’s spurning of neoliberal universalizing tendencies, encouraging 
the country to turn to a more particularizing framing of Islamic financial capitalism. 
In economic geography and cognate disciplines, concerns with promoting something other 
than neoliberal values are captured in a burgeoning and heterodox body of work inspired, 
variously, by strands of political economy, political ecology and feminist theory (Brenner et al. 
2010). Feminist scholarship has long been in the vanguard of critiquing the ‘separate self’ 
assumptions that underpin neoclassical thought and portray individuals as autonomous and 
impervious to social influences (Beneria 1995). Such work includes newer forms of critical 
synthesis (for example, Fraser’s 2014 neo-Polanyian framework to encompass the ecological, 
social and economic) and some new empirical terrain, such as Islamic charitable infrastructure 
(Pollard et al. 2016), as it revisits longstanding normative questions about what ‘counts’ in 
economic exchange (Harvey 2014). Lee (2006: 415), for example, identifies value as “the often 
banal but vital life-sustaining things, ideas, relations and practices consumed, exchanged and 
produced in circuits of value”, as distinct from traditional economic interest in Theories of Value 
as “transcendent interpretations of the origins and nature of Value”. Henderson (2013) too is 
interested in social-political ideas about value (that are not reducible to a theory of capital) and 
how these shape what and how economies produce, exchange and consume. Explicit in these 
concerns with values is an attempt to recuperate more plural conceptions of value that recognize - 
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and take seriously the socio-spatial construction and reproduction of - identity, kin, reciprocity, 
obligation, equality and social justice. 
Despite the above scholarship on value, examining the political economy of markets as a 
juridical project has been largely neglected in the literature.  Yet the role of legal and related agents 
in norm production through their action and scripts in market formation is of crucial importance; 
market formation is another important arena for the burgeoning of scholarship in critical legal 
geographies (see Jones 2016).  
 
Legal scripts and market formation 
Neoliberal market exchanges depend on legal scripts, law that is codified, normative and 
generalizable. Here law is entrusted with the task of mediating economic life so as to preserve 
orderly exchanges. Yet, law-in-practice also draws from local and community norms and beliefs, 
shaped by the relational knowledge practices of both legal and extra-legal interest groups.  As 
many sociolegal scholars have shown, scripts of extra-legal actors such as international 
organizations in the form of guidelines, reports and discursive structures are an integral part of 
the legal technology of law and rule-making in world markets (Block-Lieb and Halliday 2017). 
Law, as Comaroff and Camoroff (2006) remind us, can be a coercive, colonial tool, often 
deployed to implement both the Washington Consensus and US neoliberalism by favoring an 
ethical model that maximizes individual (and enterprise) well-being (Marangos et al. 2013). 
Market-oriented laws (e.g. anti-trust and patent laws) have been remarkably successful in 
supporting competition and deregulation (Christophers 2016). In general, however, neoliberal 
scholars privilege economic incentives over legal sanctions to deal with the complexity of 
market exchanges. This is not to ignore the proliferation of regulatory policies that have been 
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erected following recent waves of financial crises, but neoliberal commentators argue that 
regulatory policies tend to generate more regulations and hence should be minimized (Styhre, 
2014).  
While the 2000 Enron collapse mandated the reporting of managerial misconduct, little 
legislation in the United Kingdom (UK) requires lawyers to act as gatekeepers of moral and 
ethical values or to monitor investment activities.4 English common law does not mandate the 
disclosure of client wrong-doing. In the US, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted that 
requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to police lawyers’ reporting of corporate 
misconduct. But as Fisch and Rosen (2003) note, the dominant view of client primacy continues 
to influence state ethics rules. Neoliberal authors see common law as emerging from interactions 
of free distanciated relations, making explicit what is already implicit in the habits and practices 
of market agents (Njis 2016). Law is constituted from norms of thousands of reciprocal activities 
developed over time. To assume universality, common law has privileged outcomes of 
accountability which Riles (2016) describes to be a discursive process of collateralization. 
Localization of swap agreements, for instance, entails a technocratic labor of collateral 
documentation in her study of Japan’s derivative market. Such documentation from legal and 
extra-legal experts realizes and legitimizes capital through a material pledge to reduce risk. The 
collateral can take the form of a legal text (e.g. contract, letter of credit), legal person or 
institution that helps to secure certainty from unpredictable and irrational market behaviour. 
Financial institutions in particular favor private law, such as collateral contracts, over public law 
(legislation) and government regulations because it represents a form of property rights that 
assures credit. Much of the materiality surrounding contractual norms are transcribed according 
                                                 
4 An exception is the 2007 Money Laundering Regulation (Loughrey 2011). 
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to English common law or New York State law (Flood 2007), reflecting the financial reach and 
power of London and New York City.  
Collateral lawmaking is embedded in two processes: (i) the production of “things” that 
protect exchange freedoms though products of legislature (statutes and their requirements), courts 
(rulings, documented precedents), and executive agencies (regulation); and the operation of (ii) 
law-in-practice which describes how law is interpreted and acted upon by communities of experts. 
Both processes are inherently relational involving legal agents and their intermediaries who act as 
translators of meaning between two systems arising from divergence in local and extra-local 
norms. Halliday and Carruthers (2009) argue that law internalizes contradictions since it attempts 
to balance the interests and meaning systems of various groups at local and global scales, although 
such translations are often contested and conflict-ridden. If successful, they can result in the 
transformation of problems to substantive and procedural institutional reforms. Normative 
standards develop through scripts of legitimacy. These scripts may comprise softer law such as the 
International Monetary Fund’s published procedures and World Bank’s assessment templates of 
insolvency, or, they may draw on legislative guides such as the UN Commission of International 
Trade Law. More importantly, Halliday and Carruthers maintain that validation of global law and 
acceptance of legal scripts requires the work of legitimizing translators - specialists and legal 
professionals who represent technical epistemic communities, gate-keep the adoption and 
dissemination of rules, and are engaged in everyday compliance procedures. Deploying translators 
with specialized expertise ensures that procedural fairness is perceived in the rules of deliberation 
because they help to customize a global or standardized script for local implementation. 
Alternatively, translators intermediate by ensuring better harmonization between two systems of 
meaning, and in the context of this article, between secular and religious legal knowledge systems.  
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Legal script-building is facilitated by the material expression of legal theory and 
knowledge into legal-rational rules, and the latter’s effectiveness depends on the enforcement 
power of professionalized bureaucrats.  Authority of the legal-rational bureaucracy is associated 
with functions that are discharged according to “calculable rules” and “without regard for persons” 
(Weber 2009: 215). Such a de-personalized social structure stems from capital’s need for 
predictability through objectivization of legal standards and norms in the bureaucracy. For Weber, 
the modern juridical bureaucracy is organized as a hierarchy, and authority is unevenly distributed 
between higher and lower offices. Market relations are transformed into collaterals as social 
relations in professional bureaucracies are impersonalized and professionalized. Weber’s focus on 
the character of professionalized bureaucracy is also implicit in the VoC scholarship that notes the 
role of formal (and informal) institutions such as legal institutions in regularizing firm interactions 
(Hall and Thelen 2008). 
Across a wide range of literatures then, values and their legal expressions are bound up – 
however implicitly - with the formation of markets. Production and translation of these scripts 
capture norm coalescence and practices that may be legitimized through communities of 
professionals, and in the context of this article, the rationalization of religious authority.   
 
The research project 
The research draws from a project exploring the development of Islamic finance in Malaysia 
and, specifically, how Malaysia is positioning itself as an international center for Islamic finance. 
In-depth interviews with eighteen Shariah advisors and scholars and twelve Islamic financial 
professionals including Bank CEOs, vice-presidents, heads of product development, and 
directors of risk management. Seventeen of the Shariah advisors hold a doctorate in Islamic 
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Jurisprudence, law, or Islamic Studies. Two of them are women in what is a profoundly male-
dominated profession. All of the Shariah advisors are members of Islamic financial institutions’ 
Shariah committees (IFIs), and the majority have held academic or research positions at 
Malaysia’s Islamic universities or the International Shariah Research Academy (ISRA). One 
Shariah jurist is a member of the Shariah Advisory Council at the Central Bank of Negara 
(BNM).  
The interviews were conducted between 2012 and 2015.  Six interviews with Shariah 
scholars and five with financial heads or vice-presidents occurred more than once as the authors 
returned to Malaysia for follow-up interviews. The interviewees were assured of confidentiality, 
hence their names remain anonymous in this article. In addition, the authors were invited to 
observe Shariah meetings; this included sitting in on meetings with management, site visits to the 
Central Bank and ISRA, and immersion in Shariah advisors’ lives such as observing their 
interactions with one another, observing conversations among Shariah jurists at the Central Bank 
Negara, and at times participating in Friday prayers. Access to this elite group was facilitated by 
several months of emailing, whatsapping (the preferred mode of communication in Malaysia), 
and Linkedin conversations educating potential interviewees about the research project. We 
employed a “multivoicing” approach enrolling a Bumiputra doctoral student assistant who 
traveled with Shariah jurists to meetings (see footnote 5). While the authors are non-Bumiputras,  
this has the advantage of “bracketing”, that is, minimizing the influence of previous knowledge 
on understanding the present phenomenon (Vagie, 2014). 
In addition to the qualitative interviews, we also examined a number of legal disputes. 
Due to the lack of precedence in decision-making and the pioneering status of Malaysia’s 
Shariah lawmaking, some half a dozen cases may be considered as ‘landmark’ as they are setting 
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the pace and direction for future decisions. To comment on these, we use case law reports from 
LexisNexis and the Court of Appeal as well as the Malayan Law Journal (MLJ), Current Law 
Journal (CLJ) and ISRA’s publications as part of the effort to document judicial precedents.  
 
Lawmaking in Malaysia’s Islamic financial capitalism 
Modern Malaysia’s markets have been co-constituted by global neoliberal forces and indigenous 
Chinese entrepreneurialism. The country has long been integrated into global production 
networks across the Pacific having functioned as an important electronics export platform in the 
1970s and 1980s.  Extra-territorial entanglements have been accompanied by a relatively strong 
indigenous Chinese but weak Bumiputra capitalist class. As part of the strategy to nurture the 
Bumiputra capitalist class, the 1991 National Economic Policy (NEP), Dr. Mahathir’s Vision 
2020 and Prime Minister Najib Razak’s 2010 New Economic Policy (NEP) promised to improve 
the socio-economic standing of the Malays and to increase Bumiputra’s participation in the 
economy (Islam 2010) 5. While these efforts did help expand Malay citizens’ role in economic 
development, modernization has taken on a spiritual tone with Dr. Mahathir promoting Islamic 
morality and ethics as part of the modern “New Malay” (Goh 2002). Islam is an ethnic marker; 
the Malaysian Constitution (Article 160) defines Malay to be a Malaysian citizen who “professes 
the religion of Islam”. Cultivating ethics in the Islamic financial industry involves 
professionalizing Shariah knowledge and institutionalizing legal scripts at the federal level. 
 
A/The Geography of Shariah Professionalization   
                                                 
5 Under Article 153, the Malay as well as non-Malay indigenous populations of Sabah and Sarawak, also 
known as Bumiputra, are constitutionally protected by special privileges that safeguard their interests in 
education, federal employment, firm ownership and agriculture. 
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Validation of English common law relies on the scripting of institutional processes such as 
codified rules (statutes), the written act (regulation), and contract. Islam deals with human 
relations with Allah and human relations with one another; it is a “living law” that is ritualistic 
providing guidance for the everyday life of Muslims. All human action may be classified, for 
example, zakat or alms-giving is an obligatory action while the sale of alcohol is forbidden 
(haram). As Shariah law assumes a divine character, it is not rationalized through a set of 
generalizable rules like common law (Lane and Redissi 2016). Shariah law is juristic drawing 
from four major schools of thought. “Law” arises from jurists’ ijtihad  (i.e. cognitive process of 
individual reasoning to derive law from Shariah). Religious rulings or verdicts are issued through 
“fatwas”, and judgment varies from case to case.  In this section, we argue that Shariah is being 
rationalized in Malaysia through geographical centralization as well as professionalization of 
Shariah scholars and jurists.  
 While the Sultan of each state of Malaysia is officially charged with the role of 
controlling Islamic affairs, religious observance among rural Muslims operates largely through 
their relationships with village religious elites, that is, muftis and ulamas.  Rural religious elites 
derive their power from their ability to read the Koran and hadiths. The emergence of an urban 
elite, however, has seen the modernization of ulamas in cities. Increasingly armed with 
educational credentials from local and foreign universities, they are promoting a more rational 
scientific approach to Islam and treating rural Islam as mystical and ritualistic (Nagata 1982, 
Hamayotsu 2002). Indeed the rise of an urban class of Shariah professionals and bureaucrats has 
paralleled the growth of Islamic finance. Dr. Mahathir, who became Prime Minister in 1981, 
embarked on a strategy of Islamization that became increasingly pronounced through the 1990s. 
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His Vision 2020 sought to transform Malaysia into a developed country and to create modern 
Malay subjects.  
 Determined to find a place for Malaysia in the global economy (Khoo 2003), Dr. 
Mahathir began a process of state-led strategic alliances. Deeply suspicious of the policies of 
neoliberal international institutions, Dr. Mahathir attributed the 1997 financial crisis to currency 
speculation and excessive risk-taking (Mahathir 2000). His criticism of Western capitalism, 
beginning with his “Buy British Last” in the early 1980s and capital controls in the late 1990s, 
was paralleled by a “Look Westward” orientation towards the Middle East (Ooi 2006). In effect, 
Dr. Mahathir’s spiritual economy involved populating the government bureaucracy with Malay 
and Muslim technocrats, and in the context of Islamic finance, banking analysts, Shariah 
professionals, jurists and advisers.  
Shariah professionals and bureaucrats tend to concentrate in cities, particularly Kuala 
Lumpur, that are home to the top Islamic universities and research centers. Many of the 
professionals possess university degrees, frequently with a post-graduate degree including a 
doctoral degree. The establishment of International Islamic University (IIUM) and INCEIF 
(International Center for Education in Islamic Finance) has produced a skilled pool of graduates 
available for expanding the Shariah bureaucracy particularly at the federal level. It is noteworthy 
that INCEIF was established by the Central Bank to raise bureaucratic competence.  All of the 
thirty interviewees possess at least a bachelor degree and virtually all of the Shariah advisors 
graduated with a doctorate in Shariah or Shariah jurisprudence from IIUM, INCEIF, a British, 
American or Australian university. One informant pointed out that there are now more than 150 
Shariah advisors in Malaysia sitting on IFIs’ Shariah committees.  As for financial professionals, 
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the majority graduated with a bachelor in finance, economics, accounting, Islamic finance and 
even engineering, with half of them holding an MBA.  
 Perhaps the most significant professionalization process is associated with the conferring 
of institutional authority on a group of experts as Shariah arbiters in the Islamic financial 
industry. Shariah professionals are entrusted with the responsibility for ensuring that transactions 
are Shariah compliant through two-tier governance. For the first tier, IFIs are required to put in 
place a Shariah committee that is appointed by the board of directors. For the second tier, 
Parliament has enacted legislation that concentrates final Shariah rulings on the Shariah 
Advisory Council (SAC) housed in the Central Bank Negara (BNM). Should there be any 
dispute at the first tier, the SAC has the final say. While the first tier is found in many Gulf 
countries, Malaysia is the only country to offer a centralized SAC whose rulings are legally 
binding nationally. 
The first-tier Shariah committee, approved by BNM, is tasked with monitoring various 
aspects of the bank’s activities including risk management, review, audit and research. While it 
is not unusual to find product development specialists or non-Shariah professionals on the 
committee, approval of the activity and contract must be endorsed by at least three Shariah 
credentialed advisors (Interview, 2 February 2015). The committee reports directly to the board 
and alerts the board to any non-compliant activities. While such a committee or advisory board is 
also mandated in many Gulf countries, particularly countries that follow AAOIFI (Accounting 
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions) guidelines, governance surrounding 
the composition of the Shariah committee in Malaysia has taken pains to minimize conflicts of 
interest associated with multiple boards. Specifically, a Shariah advisor is able to serve on the 
committee of only one Islamic bank and one Takaful (Islamic insurance) or investment company. 
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Shariah advisors are concentrated among a small elite group and it is not uncommon for them to 
sit on several Shariah boards or committees (Bassens et al. 2011, and Pollard and Samers, 2013).  
A 2013 report by Bloomberg found that one Syrian Scholar was advising up to 101 IFIs6. One 
reason for multiple boards lies in the small number of professionals who are experts of the field 
(Islamic Finance 2015) although Malaysia’s human capital supply has been rising with the 
establishment of IIUM and INCEIF. Limiting the number of committees on which Malaysian 
Shariah advisors can be members is also designed to diminish “Shariah risks”. But while 
contracts minimize transaction costs in neoliberal markets, they are also a moral collateral that 
minimizes “gharar” (uncertainty and deception) in Islamic markets.  
“We need to ensure that there is transparency – meaning that whenever you sign 
an agreement with a client, you must ensure that the client understand the terms of 
the contract. This is also the same with the bank. The bank cannot hide things 
from the customer. It must be transparent … in conventional they have the same 
thing.”  
 
“You know “gharar” right? That element must be put away to make sure that 
everything is transparent. There must not be any ambiguity and must have 
certainty.”  (Interview, 23 Feburary 2015). 
 
 Mahathir (2010) notes that the authority and status of local and rural muftis and ulamas 
depend on relatively small areas of jurisdictions, that is “kariahs”, where their fatwas are revered 
reflecting the geographical influence of local mosques. The geographical boundaries of kariahs, 
more specifically kariah masjids, depend on the influence of the masjid (mosque) and their 
muftis. But modernizing a structure of disparate kariah authority involves building a more 
Weberian rational structure populated by professionals. The emergence of urban ulamas is, in 
part, precipitated by an alliance between state elites and Shariah bureaucrats in cities, particularly 
                                                 
6 “Malaysia exposes Shariah scholars to jail for breaches”, Bloomberg, 24 August 2013. 
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Kuala Lumpur, as Shariah professionals have been placed on state as well as IFIs’ payrolls. One 
informant, on the Shariah committee of HSBC bank, summarizes the geography of 
professionalization as follows: 
“So we have fourteen states, and each state has its own muftis. So one mufti may 
advise five to six banks. After 2008, the government advised Bank Negara 
Malaysia to include Shariah professional experts to become more involved in 
Islamic finance.  Since then, each bank has its own Shariah units, that is 
committees.” (Interview, 15 February 2015) 
 
Shariah professionals in IFIs and government administration are rewarded with higher 
salaries, power, status and mobility especially those recruited to federal agencies in charge of 
administering Shariah compliance. They are more cosmopolitan than their rural counterparts 
actively codifying legal discourses and engaging in Islamic legal theorization at ISRA.  Three of 
our Shariah informants are reputable scholars at ISRA whose publications are cited here. Two of 
them are involved in documenting Shariah judicial precedents including the cases examined in 
the next section. Part of the advisors’ power lies not only in drafting Shariah contracts, but 
transforming Shariah theory and rulings into legal norms, and assessing or monitoring IFIs’ 
financial affairs. Script production is a legal technique that reduces Shariah risks, and such 
scripts are expected to meet norms of accountability like financial reporting in the conventional 
sector.  
It is, however, the establishment of Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) that edges the 
country towards Weber’s notion of legal order.  As the above quote suggests, relying on state 
muftis often produces ‘fatwa-shopping’ where IFIs can graze different states for a ruling that is 
favorable to their activity. Decoupling a decentered system of Shariah mediation at the state 
level, and, dominance of common law in Islamic commercial judgments creates a centralized 
Shariah authority that supercedes offices at the state level. Responsibility for mediation lies in 
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the SAC which serves as the ultimate Shariah body at the federal level with the power to educate 
and inform civil court deliberations. Nine of the ten members of SAC are Shariah jurists and 
ulamas holding at the minimum, a bachelor degree in Shariah. Six of them possess post-graduate 
degrees (two Masters and four doctorates) in Islamic law or Shariah, and two of them have 
published books on Shariah’s relationship with the industry. The tenth member is not Shariah 
credentialed but a federal judge at the Court of Appeal. As we argue below, inclusion of a civil 
legal agent is not accidental; it is central to the translation of knowledge between secular and 
religious knowledge systems. 
The two-tier governance level enables the federal reclaiming of Shariah values that 
historically have been debated at the state level. One informant describes such a centripetal  
process as offering “legal certainty”, and expects countries in the Middle East to emulate the 
model:   
“I think the Middle East is adapting many things that we are doing. We have a 
Central Shariah Board. They don’t have but I think there are quite a number of 
regulators who are talking that they might have the same approach. But these 
people will never say they are taking it from Malaysia.” (Interview, 17 April 
2014) 
 
The geographical consolidation of Shariah commits IFIs, state muftis and ulamas as well as civil 
abjudicators to the power of a bureaucratic super-agency that is supported by federal statutes. 
The government also set up a separate division, the Muamalat Court, in the commercial arm of 
the High Courts in Kuala Lumpur where most financial disputes are litigated. While the 
Muamalat Court is not a separate legal system, its cases are confined to Islamic commercial 
issues. More importantly, its decisions are sensitive to SAC’s Shariah rulings, allowing the 
latter’s scripts to become an important instrument of rationality. 
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Rescaling Shariah Legal Norms 
Legal actors in the neoliberal environment are generally associated with the conceiving, drafting 
and enforcing of legal texts that protect property rights and certainty of exchange. Law here is 
presented as rational, universal, and part of the claim to modernity.  Such an approach to law is, 
however, criticized by proponents of Islamic finance. Shariah law purports to govern an 
economy that cultivates human virtues of social justice and equality (e.g. poverty alleviation). 
Exchanges that involve interest (riba) and excessive gambling, or the commodification of 
cultural vices such as prostitution and alcohol are forbidden7. In this section, we show that 
Shariah professionals and jurists are asserting their role in secular lawmaking, backed by 
political support. Law-in-practice in Islamic finance has seen the gradual insertion of Shariah 
scripts and the norms of ethics they articulate in the secular judicial process. 
 Historically, Malaysia inherited a colonial system based on English common law; the 
Shariah legal system runs parallel to the common law system. Until recently, decisions made at 
the Shariah courts could be overridden by the civil courts which are responsible for 
implementing federal law.  British colonial officers delegated Islamic rulings to the Sultans of 
each state but retained authority over the civil courts; this spatial hierarchy of legal authority 
persists today. Thus, punishments meted out by the Shariah court cannot exceed fines or 
imprisonment sentences of the civil courts. Subordination of the Shariah legal system is not 
unique to Malaysia. In many Gulf (GCC) countries, Shariah courts are well-equipped to handle 
personal and family law but commercial transactions, particularly financial transactions, continue 
                                                 
7 Kuran (2012) argues that eighteenth century European financiers were also concerned with the ethics of 
interest but these concerns dissipated with the dominance of market reasoning provided by Adam Smith 
and David Hume. He suggests that Islam’s failure to transform Shariah principles around the banning of 
interest contributed to the lack of financial growth in the Middle East and subsequent economic 
divergence from the West. 
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to draw on English or New York State law. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the legal system is 
Islamic, conferring ultimate judicial authority on its Shariah Court, yet its Shariah legal system 
provides little guidance on riba. This has encouraged IFIs to conduct their activities like 
conventional banks (Hasan 2012). One reason for the popularity of English common law is its 
flexibility. Referring to common law, a former governor of Saudi Arabia’s monetary agency 
declared most financial transactions to be “permissible” and “Someone has to tell me if and how 
it contravenes [Islam] explicitly” (cited from Colon 2012: 416). This “someone”, will be a 
Shariah translator who mediates between two systems of meaning and knowledge.  
To give an example, we can consider the financing of property and real estate, which is 
relatively popular in Islamic banking. Many transactions are offered through an Al-Bai Bithman 
Ajil (BBA) facility. Under BBA, the bank purchases an asset, say property, for a client and sells 
the property back to the client with a pre-determined profit. The client then pays the borrowed 
sum and the profit to the bank in a series of installments. What happens in the event of a default 
of repayment by the client?  Is the bank to recover the outstanding borrowed sum on the full term 
of the contract that includes the pre-determined profit? From the client’s point of view, such an 
interpretation is onerous as the payment would be greater than under a conventional loan; in the 
latter, no interest is applied on the unexpired tenure of the loan.  
In Affin Bank Berhad v Zulkifli bin Abdullah [2006, 1 CLJ 438]; [2006, 3 MLJ 67]8, the 
High Court judge Abdul Wahab Patail applied the principle of equity, reasoning that the 
defendant would have been better off with a conventional loan bearing riba. Here, English 
                                                 
8 Judicial decisions are well-recorded.  Th report of this case for example is hosted in the Chief 
Registrar’s office of the Court of Appeal under No. W-02-918-2008 [2009] MYCA 47. Other sources 
include the Malayan Law Journal (MLJ) and Current Law Journal (CLJ). Following Cornell Law 
School’s case citations, the parties’ names are italicized and listed first followed by date and volume of 
publication, title of journal and the first page number.  
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common law was applied with the Justice treating the contract as a loan rather than a sale. A sale 
is permissible in Shariah; on the other hand, riba is implicated in a loan. The ruling created 
consternation among Shariah lawyers and jurists who worried that issues of Shariah ethics and 
morality associated with riba were disregarded in the judicial decision-making process (Hasan 
and Asutay 2011; Markom et al 2013). It raises questions about the ability of the civil court to 
accomodate Shariah (Buang 2007). 
The ruling also unsettled IFIs as 70% of Malaysian home financing is made using BBA 
contracts. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) filed twelve separate appeals to the Court of 
Appeal because the ruling adversely affected its ability to recover pre-determined profits from its 
defaulters under BBA contracts. In one of the appeals, Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v Lim Kok Hoe 
& Anor and Other Appeals [2009, 6 CLJ 22]; [2009, 6 MLJ 839], the Court of Appeal 
overturned Justice Abdul Wahab Patail’s ruling concluding that BBA was a sale contract that 
should not be compared with a conventional loan. Notably, the Appeal Court disagreed with the 
High Court’s interpretation of the “religion of Islam”.  Earlier, Justice Abdul Wahab Patail had 
questioned the validity of the BBA facility because its jurisprudence principles were based 
largely on the Shafi’i school, even though there are four Sunni schools of jurisprudence. One 
prominent Shariah interviewee, the president of an Islamic University, observed that Malaysian 
Shariah scholars’ proclivity towards Shafi’i fiqh compared to the more conservative Hanbali of 
Saudi Arabia reflects the country’s history of Islamic law and the latter’s validation among the 
local population. But as financial transactions’ complexity increases and more disputes are being 
litigated, juristic deliberations are also maturing and drawing from other schools.  In this case, 
the Court of Appeal upheld the validity of BBA and decided that the secular court was in no  
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position to define Islam or to determine the validity of Shariah jurisprudence given the existence 
of SAC.  
Perhaps the best example of the court’s turn to Shariah jurist translators for substantive 
interpretations is the case of Tan Sri Abdul Khalid bin Ibrahim v Bank of Islam Malaysia Bhd 
[2009, 6 MLJ 416]; [2012, 7 MLJ 597]; [2013, 4 CLJ 794]. This case is both long-drawn and 
complex; below we summarize the main highlights. The bank BIMB had provided two 
Murabaha9 facilities to Tan Sri Khalid to acquire and redeem a company’s shares that were 
subsequently restructured into a BBA agreement. Having defaulted on the Murabaha agreements 
previously, Tan Sri Khalid defaulted once again on the first installment of the BBA leading 
BIMB to apply for a summary judgment. In May of 2007, Tan Sri Khalid sued BIMB alleging 
that the BBA facility was a riba-bearing loan and inconsistent with Islam. As both the purchase 
and sale of the shares had occurred at the same time - raising the possibility that a sale 
transaction may not have occurred -  the bank was alleged to be non-Shariah compliant. Two 
weeks later, BIMB filed a separate suit to recover its payment. Both suits were consolidated in 
2008 (thereafter “Khalid case”).  
At this point, it is important to highlight the chronology of events. The 1958 Central 
Bank Act and its amendment in 2003, offered the civil court considerable discretionary power to 
consult with Shariah lawyers and jurists concerning Shariah matters. This changed with the 
enactment of the Central Bank Act (CBA) 2009 which stated that the court or arbitrator shall 
                                                 
9 Strictly speaking, Murabaha is a concept than a mode of financing. It conceptualizes a form of sale with 
a mark up price. But murabaha may be realized as a financing mode if the sale involves a commodity or 
trade. BBA uses the murabaha concept for a sale contract but BBA may also draw from other concepts. 
Specifically, BBA is popularly used to finance house purchases but it may also be used for the purchase 
of shares or for educational purpose. 
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“refer such question [i.e. Shariah matters] to the Shariah Advisory Council for its ruling” (section 
56 1b), and the ruling “shall be binding” on the court or arbitrator (section 57).  The High Court 
judge was Datuk Rohana Yusuf.  Deciding the Khalid case at a time before CBA 2009 came into 
effect, she became the first judge to make an enquiry to the SAC for a ruling of BBA stating that: 
“there will always be differences in views and opinions in Shariah, particularly in the area of 
muamalah...” [2010, 4 CLJ 388] (see also Markom and Yaacob, 2012). In rendering the 
statement, the judge understood the juristic nature of Shariah law and the relevance of SAC 
rulings even though it was within her discretion not to do so. SAC’s secretariat confirmed that 
the BBA Agreement was permissible.  Justice Rohana Yusuf’s role warrants some attention: 
credentialed in Shariah in addition to common law, she opened the court’s jurisdictional space to 
SAC resolution. 
Unhappy with the judgment, Tan Sri Khalid appealed to the Court of Appeal which 
agreed to a High Court trial under judge Mohd Zawawi bin Salleh in 2011.  At the same time, 
given Tan Sri Khalid’s charge that the BBA was not Shariah compliant, BIMB requested that the 
court refer to SAC for its ruling on BBA, noting that its own in-house Shariah committee had 
approved the facility. Tan Sri Khalid objected to the SAC consultation on grounds that sections 
56 and 57 of the newly enacted CBA 2009 could not be applied retrospectively. More 
importantly, he contended that both sections contravened the Federal Constitution; hence SAC 
rulings were unconstitutional and would usurp the functions of the civil courts.  Justice Mohd 
Zawawi bin Salleh ruled otherwise, concluding that sections 56 and 57 are “valid federal law” 
and may be invoked retrospectively as a matter of procedure. Further, he reinforced the 
constitutional role of SAC noting the limits of secular legal expertise:  
“Even if expert evidence is allowed to be given in court to explain or clarify any 
point of law relating to Islamic banking, civil judges would be in a difficult 
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situation to decide because the divergence of opinions among Islamic jurists and 
scholars to which the opposing experts might have and which they will urge the 
court to adopt may be so complex to enable civil judges to make an independent 
determination of Shariah principles.” (Malayan Law Journal (2015): lii). 
 
Tan Sri Khalid appealed against the decision but the Court of Appeal upheld Justice Mohd 
Zawawi bin Salleh’s rulings including the constitutionality of SAC. Both Justices Rohana Yusuf 
and Mohd Zawawi bin Salleh saw the SAC as an important arbiter of Shariah (Markom and 
Yaakub 2012). Justice Rohana Yusuf, for instance, had been a Muamalat Court judge while 
Justice Mohd Zawawi bin Salleh had served as deputy head of the Shariah Advisory Division at 
the Attorney General’s Chamber. Their rulings, particularly those of Justice Mohd Zawawi bin 
Salleh’s, have been described to be “perhaps the best judgment of a Malaysian [civil] court on 
Islamic banking to date” by a former Chief Justice (Mohamad and Trakic 2013: 38). 
Lawmaking need not be confined to Shariah credentialed legal agents. Moustafa (2013) 
asserts that Muslim civil lawyers with no knowledge of Shariah are able to operate in Malaysia’s 
“Anglo-Muslim law” because the application of English common law to Malaysian Muslims has 
historically carried some element of Islamic jurisprudence. Former Chief Justice Tun Abdul 
Hamid Mohamad, for example, holds a bachelor degree in English common law, served on the 
High Court, Court of Appeal and Federal Court before becoming Chief Justice. He was also 
judge of the Shariah Court of Appeal in Penang and a former member of the SAC. In assessing 
Malaysia’s legal framework for global Islamic finance, he argues, 
“…lawyers play a very important role in finance, conventional or Islamic …we 
have an advantage.  Most of our lawyers who specialize in Islamic finance are 
Muslims. The faith factor is there.” (Bank Negara 2013, p. 94). 
 
The above quote is consistent with Moustafa’s point that Muslim civil lawyers carry some 
authority in mediating Islamic financial disputes through their familiarity with religious norms. 
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The Chief Justice’s translation between the two systems of knowledge has earned him an 
honorary degree in Shariah. Translation may be exemplified in his chairing of the Islamic 
Fiannce Law Harmonization Committee. The committee was formed to “position Malaysia as 
the reference law for International Islamic financial transactions” (Bank Negara Malaysia 2013).    
To better harmonize civil and Shariah legal spaces, the committee endorsed four amendments to 
the 1980 Rules of the High Court (RHC) and Subordinate Court Rules (SCR). One amendment 
on the judgment of debts10 (Order 42 Rule 12) took riba into consideration (Order 42 Rule 12A 
and Rule 12B). Tun Abdul Hamid Mohamad’s membership at the SAC soon after completing his 
term as Chief Justice enhanced his translational role here: the SAC issued a favorable resolution 
regarding judgment debts that allows creditors (i.e. IFIs) to recover debt and expenses between 
judgment execution to settlement. This resolution, in turn, helped to legitimize the committee’s 
amendments by inserting Shariah principles of tawidh (compensation) and gharamah (penalty) 
to civil legal scripts. Nonetheless, rescaling Shariah norms could not have happened without the 
parallel institutional building that elevated and modernized Shariah.  
 
Re-centering Shariah Authority 
If law represents a legal space of power-conferring norms, then Shariah norms are gaining a 
place in Malaysia’s juridical constitution of market norms. Shariah law acquires a material 
character through an identifiable set of scripts that encode its values. Those responsible for 
making Shariah jurisprudence, such as the ten members of SAC, are charged with powers of 
extraordinary juristic deliberations.  The SAC’s power lies in its role as the ultimate arbiter. 
                                                 
10 Under the court rules, a judge can determine up to 8% of interest to be paid to a conventional bank 
from the day-of-judgment to settlement of debt. The amendments allow IFIs to obtain compensation 
based on tawidh. 
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Juristic outcomes are documented in Shariah Resolutions in Islamic Finance (Bank Negara 
Malaysia 2010) and they are a “fatwa-based compilation”. This publication captures legal labor 
of formal text assembly by recording ijtihad consensus among the ten members. It is available 
online. In effect Shariah Resolutions codifies the permissibility of Shariah transactions through 
rationalization of various Shariah collaterals or contracts for the market. Rationalization is 
supported by reasoning from relevant fiqh schools; at times hadiths are quoted directly.  It is 
noteworthy that the second edition of Shariah Resolutions includes Islamic jurisprudence from 
non-Shafi’i schools. The publication resonates with Halliday and Carruthers’ (2009) account of 
international bankruptcy lawmaking wherein published guidelines and templates of international 
organizations contribute to legal norm production and circulation. Shariah Resolutions frames 
the content of what is ethically permissible. The resolutions do not carry the power of a statute, 
but they are supported by statutes that help insert Shariah consensus into judicial deliberation. 
Shariah Resolutions demonstrates the influence of softer scripts in mapping the material terrain 
of Shariah legal norms.  
Two federal statutes have significantly empowered SACs. As described previously, the 
2009 Central Banking Act renders SAC resolutions binding in the civil court. The second statute, 
the 2013 Islamic Financial Services Act (IFSA), empowers the Central Bank Negara to oversee 
regulatory requirements that ensure Shariah compliance of IFIs, and to specify the functions of 
the board of directors and the Shariah committee.  More importantly, the statute creates a penal 
space that criminalizes non-compliance with Shariah; non-compliance can result in 
imprisonment of up to eight years, a fine not exceeding M$25 million, or, both (Section 28 (5)). 
In associating non-Shariah compliance with criminal behavior, IFSA 2013 objectivizes Shariah 
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professional jurists’ exercise of power that strengthens Malaysia’s ambition to be a global 
Islamic financial center. This was noted by the Shariah advisor of an export-import bank:  
 
“This is the strongest act in the world. Even the Middle Eastern scholars, 
whenever they come to Malaysia for a meeting, like Dr. Hamid Hassan, they say 
that Malaysia’s law on Islamic finance is the best in the world.” (Interview, 9 
February 2015) 
 
Ratification of both Acts enables rescaled Shariah scripts to become the solutions for 
regulating Islamic transactions. As textual commands backed by statutory power, Shariah 
Resolutions encourages legal interpretations that capture the aspirations of SAC creators that 
adjudicate on how Shariah values should guide the financial community. More importantly, 
Malaysian Shariah jurists see themselves at the forefront of mediating and resolving conflicting 
fatwas from around the world. As two prominent Shariah informants said: 
“I consult with people in Southeast Asia and Middle East since I am attached to 
Bank Negara and ISRA ... I do resolutions of fatwas from all around the world. 
Only Malaysia does this.”  (Interview, 30 May 2013) 
 
“You can actually buy from BNM a book called the Resolutions of the SAC, and 
so they would say, ‘where was the issue, what was the issue with the decision and 
why it was decided that way?’ So everything is laid out clear for everybody to 
see. The students of Islamic finance can look at that and understand the logic 
behind those things. But that only happens in Malaysia. I know of Shariah 
scholars elsewhere - companies approach them for a decision and they give a yes-
no answer, and they don’t explain. And when asked to explain, they say the 
decision was arrived and things like that.” (Interview, 6 June 2012) 
 
To the extent that Shariah is now relevant in shaping IFIs’ relational exchanges, Malaysia 
is advancing a model that renders Shariah relevant for shaping market relations. Indeed the 
country is contemplating going one step further, that is, transforming the Islamic economy from 
one that is Shariah-compliant to one that is Shariah-based (Interview, 4 July 2012). 
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Conclusion 
This article has highlighted, first, the role of Shariah jurists in financial market formation through 
an analysis of lawmaking in Malaysia’s Islamic finance. Part of Malaysia’s development as an 
international center of Islamic finances rests on its critique of neoliberal practices thought to be 
devoid of moral, altruistic and ethical quality and obligation. Shariah capitalism by contrast, 
whether viewed as potentially progressive or not, advocates a moral space where personhood 
formation includes the promise of meaningful human relations and altruistic obligations. For this 
reason, the Malaysian government sees its citizens, particularly the Malay, as being entangled in 
economic activity that produces pious subjects.  A common view among Shariah scholars is that 
financial scandals are aided by neoliberal lawyers who help design highly speculative financial 
instruments. Yet the labor of Shariah involves transformation of both moral and market risks into 
legal pledges. Social exchanges that define personhood become the negotiation of material 
pledges that are treated as properties as the BBA contracts have shown. In turn, a process of 
“dereligionization” appears to be occurring (Mohamad and Saravanamuttu, 2015). 
 Second, drawing on Islamic financial litigation and interviews with Shariah scholars, we 
have demonstrated that market governance institutions are intrinsically geographical. Legal 
spaces and professionalized juridical processes have been rescaled to enhance the mobility of 
Shariah expertise transnationally. There is something of a paradox here in that the Malaysian 
model is being advanced through a centralizing spatial framing that favors the distancing of 
social relations in two ways: (i) a science of economic management and governance, and (ii) the 
entanglement of market rationalities and Islamic morality through appeals to forms of neoliberal 
accountability that in effect collateralize Shariah values (see also Rudnyckyj 2014). Lawmaking 
privileges the agency of urban Shariah professionals and translators. Shariah translators 
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intermediate between knowledge systems and transform them into portable institutional routines 
and norms that facilitate their insertion to secular legal space. Production of legal scripts replaces 
spatially varied human agency with institutional agency that reinforces market logics. Indeed one 
advantage of expressing Shariah norms through the civil court rather than a separate religious 
legal system is that common law institutions generate a sense of market certainty and 
transparency through their legal scripts. Common law promotes the recording of judicial 
precedents because the activity of text assembly captures rules, doctrines or legislative intent that 
may be regarded as evidence of the law (Hamburger 2008). Such an activity is also observed 
among Shariah scholars and jurists whose codification of juristic deliberations and judgments 
including the publication of Shariah Resolutions contributes to the development of authoritative 
templates from which rules and guidelines may be produced. They demonstrate the intimacy of 
Shariah labor to the process of Islamic financial lawmaking.  
In sum, the Malaysian model represents a juridical project that facilitates the global 
projection of its Shariah law. Lawmaking in Islamic finance does not so much represent a retreat 
from neoliberal influence but a re-ordering of market values and norms. Indeed the Malaysian 
model relies on the development of rational legal techniques to support market orderliness.  Such 
re-ordering is expected to reinforce Malaysia’s international stature in Islamic finance by 
transforming moral values into insurable properties. Malaysia’s juridical project is associated 
with the construction of Shariah collateralization that may be seen to be a form of stabilizing 
presence against the destabilizing effect of neoliberal financial forces. 
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